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Abstract
Policymakers have good reasons to favor capital-based policies – such as CAFE
standards or feebates programs – over a carbon price. A carbon price minimizes
the discounted cost of a climate policy, but may result in existing capital being
under-utilized or scrapped before its scheduled lifetime, hurt the workers that
depend on it, and inflict an immediate income drop. Capital-based policies avoid
these obstacles, but can reach a given climate target only if implemented early
enough. Delaying mitigation policies may thus create a political-economy lock-
in (easier-to-implement policies become unavailable) in addition to the economic
lock-in (the target becomes more expensive).
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Introduction
For the past centuries, the global economy has been installing fossil-fueled
capital (infrastructure, production processes, energy extraction) that releases
greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. From a global welfare perspective,
this accumulation of polluting capital is sub-optimal because it does not inter-
nalize the future economic damages caused by climate change. In other words,
fossil-fueled capital has been overvalued for decades, and the world has made
suboptimal technological choices based on distorted prices. Today, a large-scale
transition towards clean capital accumulation is needed.
To promote this transition, governments have introduced various capital-
based instruments, such as energy efficiency standards on new capital (e.g.
CAFE standards, norms for new buildings and home appliances) or fiscal in-
centives, such as the “feebates” programs in the automobile sector (Anderson
et al., 2011).
Capital-based instruments are less efficient than a carbon price. They reg-
ulate emissions embedded in new capital only, instead of regulating all GHG
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gases in the economy as a carbon price would do, and they create the risk of
rebound effects if greater energy efficiency leads to more extensive use (Goulder
and Parry, 2008).
In Rozenberg et al. (2013b), we argue that the lower efficiency of capital-
based instruments comes with an increased social and political acceptability.
These instruments reduce the short-term cost of climate mitigation and make a
carbon tax more acceptable in the long term. By spreading the costs over time
and citizens, they ease the political economy of the transition to clean capital.
A carbon price can induce firms and households to stop using part of their ex-
isting polluting capital, with significant consequences on short-term output, em-
ployment and consumption. Such an outcome may be politically unacceptable.
Instead, capital-based instruments give firms and households the opportunity
to make investments consistent with the turnover of their capital stock, that is
to keep using existing capital until it depreciates, while investing in cleaner new
capital. This may explain why societies are so reluctant to implement carbon
taxes, let alone a global agreement on a unique carbon price, and have relied on
capital-based instruments such as standards and subsidies instead.
An important downside of capital-based policies is that they cannot curb
emissions as fast as the carbon price. If a carbon tax remains impossible to im-
plement in the near future and the transition has to be triggered by capital-based
instruments, their slowness makes their implementation (and enforcement) all
the more urgent.
A Ramsey model with clean and dirty capital
In Rozenberg et al. (2013b) we compare analytically a carbon price with
a set of “capital-based” instruments, and investigate how the inter-temporal
distribution of abatement efforts is modified when using these alternative in-
struments.
We use a simple Ramsey model with two types of capital: “brown” capital
and “green” capital. Brown capital emits greenhouse gases that accumulate in
the atmosphere. Moreover, brown investment is supposed irreversible, meaning
that for instance, a coal plant cannot be turned into a wind turbine, and only
disappears through depreciation.
In the model, reducing emissions can be done through two channels. First,
through a substitution between brown and green capital, i.e. structural change
(as in Acemoglu et al., 2012). This option is slow because it requires capital
accumulation in the green sector and depreciation in the brown sector (Vogt-
Schilb et al., 2012).
Second, it is possible to instantly reduce emissions through under-utilization
of brown capital (or equivalently early-scrapping), i.e. through a contraction of
the output volume. This allows unlimited short-term abatement.
Starting from a laissez-faire economy that uses mainly brown capital, a
social planner decides to maintain the concentration of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere below a certain threshold. This threshold can be interpreted as
the carbon budget corresponding to an exogenous policy objective such as the
UNFCCC “2◦C target”,1 or as a tipping point beyond which the environment
(and welfare) can be highly damaged.
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Figure 1: Installed and utilized capital in the intertemporally-optimal transition
(with a carbon price). When the carbon price is implemented at t0, brown capi-
tal may be suddenly under-utilized, raising political acceptability issues. At ti, the
overabundant brown capital has naturally depreciated. The balanced growth path is
reached at tb.
Note: we used different scales for green and brown capital.
Capital-based policies lead to the same long-term outcome than the
carbon price, without hurting the owners of existing capital
Two strategies are compared to comply with the same climate target. The
first one uses a carbon price to regulate all GHG emissions. The second strat-
egy uses alternative instruments that regulate emissions from new capital only,
allowing a full utilization of brown capital in the short-run.
We show that the two strategies lead to the same balanced long-term growth
path (after tb in Fig. 1). But since investment is irreversible, the economy
cannot shift instantaneously to the optimal pathway and the two strategies
induce different trajectories during the transition period.
A carbon price minimizes the discounted cost of the transition. When it is
implemented, the economy stops investing in brown capital to invest only in
green capital.2 Over the short run, the structure of the economy (the ratio of
installed brown to green capital) is not consistent with the new prices. Installed
brown capital adjusts to its long-term optimal path through natural depreciation
(until ti in Fig. 1).
During this phase, if the carbon price is lower than the marginal productivity
of installed brown capital (as measured in output per emissions), installed brown
capital is still fully-used. But if the carbon price is higher, brown capital is
under-utilized to reduce immediately carbon emissions (Fig. 1 between t0 and
ti).
3
The short-term under-utilization of brown capital has significant short-term
impacts on production, which lowers the social and political acceptability of cli-
mate policies. It creates two redistribution effects: first, it imposes a downward
step on income in exchange for higher consumption for future (possibly richer)
generations; second, it affects primarily the owners of brown capital and the
workers who depend on it.
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Figure 2: On the left, output in the two cases. In the short-run output is lower in the
first-best case because of the adjustment of brown capital utilization. On the right,
consumption is higher in the second-best case because of a higher output. tb is the
date when the balanced growth path is reached.
Capital-based policies act as a shadow subsidy in favor of declining
brown capital
Instead, it is possible to reduce carbon emissions through investment deci-
sions — i.e. through the redirection of investments towards green capital —
without creating an incentive to reduce the utilization rate of brown capital.
A first solution is to differentiate green and brown investment costs, for in-
stance with fiscal incentives, feebates programs or concessional loans for clean
capital. Capital costs can also be differentiated using financial markets (Rozen-
berg et al., 2013a). A second possibility is to regulate new investment through
energy efficiency standards (as done for house appliances and personal vehicles).
A last possible solution is to complement the carbon price with temporary sub-
sidies to the use of brown capital for the most vulnerable firms or households,
so that they see a lower carbon tax and keep using their polluting capital in the
short-run.4
In our model, these three instruments are equivalent. In practical terms,
it would be equivalent to (i) enforce standards for individual vehicle energy
efficiency (e.g., CAFE standards), (ii) implement a feebate on cars (depending
on their emissions), and (iii) introduce a carbon price and a subsidy to the
owners of highly-polluting vehicles. Also, the three instruments eventually lead
to the same long-term balanced growth path as a carbon price would, after the
transition phase.
When capital-based instruments are implemented, investment in brown cap-
ital stops until the structure of the economy has adjusted (as with the carbon
price). However, capital-based instruments provide no incentive to under-utilize
available brown capital during the transition. The total discounted welfare is
lower than in the optimum, but output is higher over the short-run because
brown capital is used at full capacity even during the transition (Fig. 2). At
one point, the amount of brown capital has adjusted, making it possible to
introduce a carbon price without capital under-utilization, hence without the
acceptability issues discussed earlier.
Capital-based policies therefore only differ temporarily from the first-best
pathway, in a way that smooths the transition costs: they decrease efforts in
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Figure 3: Depending on emissions (i.e. brown capital) when the policy is imple-
mented at t0 and on the carbon budget at t0 (the climate target), the carbon tax
and capital-based instruments can lead to different or similar outcomes. While the
economy is on the laissez-faire growth path (red arrow), brown capital accumulates
and the carbon budget is reduced (for a given climate objective).
the short-run, increase them in the medium-run, and leave them unchanged in
the long-run.
Race against the lock-in
The carbon price does not always lead to under-utilize brown capital, de-
pending on the stringency of the climate target and the level of emissions em-
bedded in installed capital (Fig. 3). As long as climate policies are absent
(or very lax), the global economy accumulates brown capital, making GHG
emissions grow and reducing the carbon budget for a given climate target (the
“conventional growth path” in Fig. 3).
If the amount of preexisting brown capital is low (left hand side, Fig. 3), a
carbon tax does not lead to under-utilization of brown capital and reaching the
climate target is possible and optimal without a downward step in income. In
this case, the carbon price consistent with the climate target leads to the exact
same growth path as capital-based policies. This is a situation of “flexibility”
in which a country can chose a brown or a green development path at low cost,
using either a carbon price or capital-based instruments.
At one point, brown capital reaches the level when a carbon price induces
capital under-utilization and its negative political economy consequences. From
there, a carbon price becomes more difficult to implement. But the alterna-
tive option of using capital-based instruments is available, leading to higher
inter-temporal costs but no immediate drop in income. There is a window of
opportunity, during which alternative capital-based instruments may induce a
smooth and acceptable transition to a low-carbon economy.
If this occasion is missed (right hand side, Fig. 3), it becomes impossible to
reach the climate target without under-utilization of brown capital and capital-
based options are not available any more (if the climate objective is not revised).
According to Davis et al. (2010), the level of existing polluting infrastructure in
2010 is still low enough to achieve the 2◦C target without under-utilizing brown
capital, suggesting that the global economy is not in this last region yet.5 When
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we get in this area, not only the economic cost of reaching the climate target is
higher, but the political economy also creates a carbon lock-in: the only option
to reach the climate target has a significant short-term cost, making it more
difficult to implement successfully a climate policy consistent with the target.
Conclusion
There is a trade-off between the inter-temporal optimality of a climate pol-
icy and the acceptability of its short-term impacts. In pure economics terms,
the carbon tax is the best tool to maximize discounted welfare. But public
policy is especially difficult in contexts where costs are immediate, concentrated
and visible; and benefits are diffuse over time and over citizens (Olson, 1971).
Capital-based instruments can help spread the cost of climate mitigation over
time and across citizens.
Standard economic theory establishes that this equity issue is best tackled
using targeted lump-sum cash transfers to compensate the losers. In practice,
however, it may not be feasible to monitor and compensate each individual loser
of climate mitigation policies (e.g., Kanbur, 2010). The transfers themselves
may appear unacceptable to other actors, especially if they go to a relatively
wealthy population. Instead, capital-based instruments have the potential to
tackle both the efficiency (they reduce emissions) and the equity (they compen-
sate losers) functions of a climate mitigation policy.
Sector-specific capital-based instruments create risks from capture and rent-
seeking (Laffont and Tirole, 1991). Applying them is therefore challenging: it
requires strong institution settings and controls (Rodrik, 2008). But if a carbon
price — possibly complemented with lump-sum transfers for equity reasons —
remains impossible to implement and if policy-makers take the climate issue
seriously, the question is not whether to implement capital-based instruments
or not, but when and how to do it (Hallegatte et al., 2013).
Notes
1Climate research shows that global temperature change may be approximated by cumu-
lative emissions (Allen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009).
2During this period, the rental price of brown capital decreases below that of green capital.
3During this period, the rental price of brown capital decreases to zero (polluting capital
is overabundant).
4The free allowance distributed to energy-intensive industries during the implementation
of the EU-ETS (also known as grandfathering) is similar to this last option.
5Davis et al. (2010) do not discuss whether an optimal climate policy (i.e. a policy that
minimizes the discounted cost) would lead to under-utilization, that is whether we are in the
top or the middle triangle in Fig. 3.
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